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Abstract: This study examines the relationship between domestic constraints and the implementation of 
international agreements by concentrating on the process of ratification. Specifically, I empirically focus on the 
case of German defection and the NATO mission to Libya. Since the main theories of international cooperation 
lacked the focus on domestic factors, this study tests the role of five domestic factors. However, with respect to 
their relative influence, I argue that domestic constraints are influenced themselves by (historical) narratives and 
prominent political elites.  
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Introduction 
In 2010 NATO adopted its new strategic concept; a consensus based guide line for the next decade. It identified 
and prioritized the ten capabilities that the 28 member states agreed were essential to the organization's strength, 
not only in today's operations but also in the future. These were, amongst others, missile defense and joint 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Daalder and Stavridis 2012, 3). The durability of this agreement 
was soon tested because merely a year later the situation in the Arabic countries called for international help. 
One of these violent events was the March 2011 crisis in Libya, which was unexpected and escalated rapidly 
(Bellamy and Williams 2011, 838). NATO wanted to intervene in Libya by imposing a no-fly zone, Germany 
however abstained from voting on the UN resolution which was supported by Germany's traditional allies and 
NATO partners and made NATO intervention possible. By voting to abstain Germany formalized one of its most 
controversial foreign policy decision in many years (Brockmeier 2013, 65). On an international level, the 
country‟s abstention was perceived as a „no‟ causing harm to German‟s international position and its status as 
great power. On a domestic level, German journalists pointed out a strategic shift in Germans foreign policy 
towards the so called BRIC-countries.
1
 Anyhow, German defection on taking part in a NATO no-fly zone 
mission to Libya raises questions about the implementation of international commitments.   
Defections from international commitments are not uncommon. But why did Germany's national leader Angela 
Merkel and her foreign minister Guido Westerwelle not follow up on their international agreement made in the 
North Atlantic Council in 2010? The study of International Relations provides three main theories to answer this 
question: Realism, (neo) Institutionalism and Social Constructivism.
2
 A Realist scholar had argued that military 
intervention was not in the interest of the German state. Moreover, he would not even recognize the importance 
of the existence of NATO itself (Dunne and Schmidt 2008, 93-94). On the other hand, scholars within the theory 
of (neo) Institutionalism would have underlined the importance of an institution like NATO because they believe 
such an institution is deeply embedded in cultural, social, and political environments. The willingness to 
cooperate is often described as a response to (international) rules, laws, conventions or paradigms (Powell 2007; 
Lamy 2008, 131-132). To conclude, a Social Constructivist had explained defection in terms of social artifacts 
(Barnett 2008, 165). However, none of these theories underlines the role of domestic politics when explaining 
foreign policy behavior of a state. As a result of the lack of focus on the role of domestic politics, my research on 
the implementation of international agreements will be placed within the framework of political factors on a 
domestic level. 
This thesis will examine the influence of German domestic constraints in the decision of military intervention in 
Libya, and does so by elaborating on the theory of a two-level game and the process of ratification as exposed by 
Jeffrey Lantis. Robert Putnam was one of the first scholars to outline a theory of two-level game, explaining the 
interaction between international and domestic politics. His assumptions were based on the phase of negotiating 
and exposed an ideal international agreement, made of preference sets in which executives had taken in to 
account domestic and international interests (Putnam 1988, 432). However, Putnam does not mention much on 
the phase thereafter; the implementation of this ideal agreement made. Jeffrey Lantis tries to bolster this „gap‟ in 
                                                             
1 See for example: ''Germany has marginalized itself over Libya'' by  Severin Weiland and Roland Nelles for Spiegel Online 
International; 18 March 2011. 
2
 See for example: Checkel, J. 1998. ''The Constructive Turn in International Relations Theory'', In: World Politics. Vol. 50 
(2), pp. 324-348. 
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the two-level game theory by elaborating on the process of ratification. Ratification is perceived as ''the formal 
voting procedure at a domestic level that is required to endorse or implement an international agreement'' 
(Putnam 1988, 436). Hence, it is crucial to understand which factors exactly are involved in the voting procedure 
on a domestic level and constrain the implementation of an international agreement during the process of 
ratification. Lantis worked out a model of political proximity in which five hypotheses on domestic factors 
determined the relative influence of these factors. Therefore the main research question for this study will be: 
Which domestic factors account for German defection on the ratification of NATO‟s strategic concept of 2010 
regarding the mission to Libya? 
Case selection and an introduction to the methodology 
I have selected Germany as my examining case because Germany is a European great power and therefore plays 
an important role in international cooperation. Germany did not sustain on its initial international agreement of 
2010 within NATO whilst its traditional allies did. That is why the study of Germany can be examined as a 
deviant case for exploration on ratification processes. This study will be conducted by research on secondary 
literature as well as (German) press releases, speeches, articles, official government releases and polls. I have 
chosen to conduct my research in this manner because it provides clarity on the motives of Germany to defect on 
the agreement to impose a no-fly zone in Libya. The thesis will start with a brief overview on the Libyan crisis 
and the response of Germany on the resolutions conducted by the international community. After that, it provides 
a theoretical framework in which the author elaborates on the five assumptions set out by Jeffrey Lantis. The 
third chapter of this study provides the reader a deeper explanation on which methodological grounds the 
analysis is conducted. It does so by elaborating on the operationalization of the variables under study. The fourth 
section analyses the case study. To conclude, this thesis summarizes the results and expires with a discussion.  
Libyan crisis and the German response 
The 2011 conflict in Libya can be linked to the political upheavals of the „Arab Spring‟ protests that spread 
throughout North-Africa at the time (Bellamy and Williams 2011, 838). Therefore the character of the protests 
was unexpected and violent, which caused the rapidly escalated situation. The aim of the protests was to expel 
president Qadhafi and initially the rebels succeeded. They established a firm hold over the cities of Benghazi and 
Tobruk and declared they had taken control of most of the country‟s other major cities (2011, 838). Spokesmen 
of the National Transitional Council of Libya –the political division of the Libyan resistance– declared at a press 
conference in Paris that the rebels want to establish a secular democracy in Libya.
3
 However, in early March 
Qadhafi‟s troops retook much of the country crushing every protest in its way. Qadhafi threatened his civilians 
by saying that ''any Libyan who takes arms against Libya will be executed''.
4
 Because of the clear threat of the 
security of Libyan civilians, UN officials framed the problem as an international case of human protection. 
Warnings on the 22th of February of UN‟s High Commissioner for Human Rights to ''stop using violence against 
demonstrators which may amount to crimes against humanity'' did not stop the bloodshed (Bellamy and Williams 
                                                             
3 See for example: ''Wie is de Libische Rebel?'', 24 March. 2011, in: de Volkskrant. As quoted by the New York Times; 
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2844/Archief/archief/article/detail/1864342/2011/03/24/Wie-is-de-Libische-rebel.dhtml 
4 Defiant Gaddafi issues chilling call‟, ABC (Australia), 23 Feb. 2011, in: 2. Bellamy, A. and Williams, P. 2011. ''The new 
politics of protection? Côte d‟Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect'', In: International Affairs. Vol. 87 (4), pp. 
825-850. 
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2011, 839). Official sanctions from the international community followed. The Arab League suspended Libyan 
delegations from its meetings whilst declaring its support to the rebels.
5
 The UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1970 and recalled the Libyan authorities responsibility to protect the rights of Libyan civilians. The 
Council condemned the use of force against civilians and imposed sanctions which included asset freezes, travel 
bans, and an arms embargo (Brockmeier 2013, 76). Nevertheless, the situation on the ground continued 
escalating. Further actions were proposed by France and the United Kingdom leading to the eventual adoption of 
UN Resolution 1973 on March 17
th
. 
Towards NATO intervention; A no-fly zone 
Potential intervention in Libya by NATO was first submitted to the UN Security Council. In case of severe 
violation of human rights, the call for military intervention is likely heard (Hellema and Reiding 2004, 128). 
Executives from the United Kingdom and France publicly considered a no-fly zone as a next step and imitated 
military planning for that purpose (Brockmeier 2013, 78). The official declaration on the no-fly zone in 
Resolution 1973 was that ''[the Security Council] decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians''.
6
 EU-member states within the UN disagreed strongly 
on the execution of Resolution 1973. Whereas France and the UK took a diplomatic leadership role, Germany 
did not. This led to a split in the European Union (regarding a unified reaction) and as a result, the EU became 
sidelined instead of promoting and enforcing its neighborhood policy (Bucher, Engel et al. 2013, 524). 
The German position on a no-fly zone underwent a crucial change in March (Brockmeier 2013, 78). In February 
German Minister of Defense, Christian Schmidt, stated in a press conference that ''EU members have to 
participate in implementation of the no-fly zone mission if the no-fly zone leads to rapid pacification and the 
saving of human lives''.
7
 Foreign minister Westerwelle, however, attributed a different opinion. On March 11
th
, 
barely a week before the adoption of Resolution 1973, he stated that Germany would only consider a no fly zone 
if there was a ''demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region'' (Brockmeier 2013, 78). Two 
days after this statement, Westerwelle and Germany‟s Permanent Representative to the UN Peter Wittig, 
emphasized Germany reticence by stressing the importance of strengthening sanctions instead of armed 
intervention.
8
 
On March 27
th, Peter Wittig eventually made one of Germany‟s most controversial foreign policy decisions:  he 
voted to abstain concerning the adoption of UN Resolution 1973 (Rinke 2011, 44). The abstention of Germany 
was not only a UN matter; it was also a concern of Germany‟s partnership within NATO. As previous mentioned 
in the introduction, in 2010 NATO adopted its new strategic concept at the Lisbon summit. Germany, amongst 
other member states, agreed on an enhanced focus on crisis prevention. One of the statements NATO 
                                                             
5 Press office Reuters, London – UK; ''Arab League suspends Libya delegation.'' February 22, 2011. 
6 Point 6  of „No Fly Zone‟ in the official declaration on the adoption of Resolution 1973 by the U.N. Security Council, 17 
March 2011. As quoted by NATO; http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-
1973.pdf. 
7 Christian-Schmidt.de. ''Pressemitteilung: Staatssekretär Christian Schmidt beim informellen Treffen der EU 
Verteidigungsminister''. February 25, 2011. 
8 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations New York. “Foreign Minister Westerwelle on Libya.” March 13, 
2011; Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations New York. “Remarks by Ambassador Wittig to the UN Press 
Corps on Libya.” March 14, 2011. 
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representatives made, was that ''allies will need to share more and better intelligence earlier and [NATO member 
states] will need to be prepared to consult quickly'' (Witmann 2011, 28). Nowadays non-Article 5 tasks are 
setting the NATO agenda, causing tension between collective defense and crisis response operations. The Allies 
agreed that further capability development and force transformation are imperative to underpin their means to 
conduct the full range of NATO missions, including collective defense and crisis response operations on and 
beyond Alliance territory (Yost 2009, 35). Germany did not follow up on this agreement, when it was asked to 
support the no-fly zone to Libya. 
For getting international agreements to work in practice, some scholars argue that the ratification process at a 
domestic level needs to be taken in consideration (Kaarbo 2012, 219). Merkel and Westerwelle had to take in 
account a lot of domestic factors when NATO asked him to deliver on the agreement made in Lisbon concerning 
the enforcement of the no-fly zone in Libya. For example, the fear of overstretching in light of the financial and 
economic crisis had damaged German public support for missions like the one to Libya (Keller 2012, 102). But 
besides public support, other domestic factors can influence foreign policy as well. The assumption that domestic 
politics can leverage international politics during the negotiation phase as much as the process of ratification 
thereafter, can well be captured within two level game theory. 
Two level game theory: exposing the interaction between international and domestic politics 
Robert Putnam was the first scholar to introduce a framework of a two-level game to explain the interaction 
between international and domestic politics (Putnam 1988, 434). As Lantis states, Putnam drew on ideas from 
game theory literature with scholars like Robert Axelrod who suggested that ''cooperation under anarchy was 
possible in certain circumstances'' (Lantis 1997, 2). Putnam recognized the work of game theory scholars but he 
departed from their original work by adding a new domestic politics dimension to the negotiation framework. 
Therefore, Putnam stated that negotiating on a deal with a foreign country is played by an executive on two 
levels. Level I of this two-level game is the international level, where national governments seek to maximize 
their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments. Level II is the domestic level where domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies. Politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among these groups 
(Putnam 1988, 433-434). As long as a state remains interdependent, neither of these two games can be ignored.  
Therefore, the states executive seeks to manipulate domestic and international politics simultaneously. 
Diplomatic strategies and tactics are constrained both by what other states will accept and by what domestic 
constituencies will ratify  (Evans, Jacobson et al. 1993, 15). 
Because the need for ratification at level II is certain to affect the level I bargaining, Putnam calculated the 
likelihood for successful negotiating (Putnam 1988, 436-437). This so called „win-set‟ for the given level II 
constituency is defined as ''the set of all possible level I agreements that could „win‟ –that is gain the necessary 
majority among the constituents– when simply voted up or down'' (Putnam 1988, 437). Therefore, his first 
assumption is that larger win-sets make level I agreements more likely, ceteris paribus. In an international 
organization, where several member states all have their own win-set, reaching an agreement is possible only 
when win-sets overlap. Conversely, the smaller the win-sets the greater the risk that negotiations will break down 
(Putnam 1988, 438). The possibility of a break down lead Putnam to distinguish between two different types of 
defection at the negotiation table: voluntary and involuntary defection (Fearon 1998, 278). Elaborating on 
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rational game theory, voluntary defection refers to egoistic reasons of a (rational) executive to defect on the 
agreement whilst involuntary defection appears when the executive lacks the ability to ratify the agreement at 
home.
9
 Involuntary defection constrains the eventual implementation of the international agreement since the 
process of ratification is essential to cooperation as Lantis assumes. 
Putnam acknowledged the fact that involuntary defection can be just as fatal to prospects for cooperation as 
voluntary defection (1988, 439). An executive‟s credibility at level I, he states, is therefore enhanced by his‟ or 
hers capability to „deliver‟ at level II. The capability to deliver at a level II is considered as the starting point of 
the process of ratification. Putnam recognizes the importance of the ratification process at a domestic level, as he 
argues that ''level II imposes a crucial link between the international and domestic politics'' (Putnam 1988, 436). 
However, his theoretical elaboration on ratification and the process of ratification is limited. It concerns ''the 
formal voting procedure at level II that is required to endorse or implement a level I agreement'' (1988, 436). 
Putnam names specific domestic factors. For example, he states that ratification can be seen as a parliamentary 
function, but  also confirms that this is not essential. He mentions that actors at level II may also concern 
''bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even public opinion'' (1988, 436). 
The impact of domestic factors on the process of ratification 
German Finance Minister Stoltenberg once mentioned the importance of the impact of domestic factors on 
foreign policy decisions by saying that: ''the limitation of cooperation lies in the fact that we are democracies, 
and we need to secure electoral majorities at home''.
10
 Previous studies have shown how domestic factors can 
influence the process of ratification. For example, Richard Eigenberg
11
 and colleagues conducted research 
(1987) on domestic constraints within NATO member states on security issues. They focused on four European 
countries‟ public opinion in relationship with support for NATO. It appeared that the presence of support for 
NATO did not automatically lead to support for defense spending. Without support for defense spending, the 
states concerning this study could not deliver on their promises made within NATO. This raised the question of 
whether commitment and support for NATO is merely symbolic, or perhaps even reflecting the „free-riding‟ 
logic which is often discussed in relation with the security organization (Domke et al 1987, 389). 
It appears that there is no scholarly consensus on how different domestic factors relatively influence the 
ratification of an international agreement. Given the focus on one domestic factor in previous research (as 
mentioned above), it is not surprising that empirical evidence is heterogeneous mixed. This means that previous 
research generates competing assertions about the likelihood of cooperation as opposed to defection behavior. To 
develop a more generalizable theory, Jeffrey Lantis identified five domestic factors which he claims are all 
crucial to explain behavior on cooperation or defection. His comparative case study (1997) of eight German 
foreign policy cases during the Cold War exposed three systemic conditions: interest, pressure and threats (Lantis 
                                                             
9 See for example: Sion, Maya. 2004. ''The Politics of Opt-Out in the European Union: Voluntary or Involuntary Defection?'' 
In: Thinking Together. Proceedings of the IWM Junior Fellows‟ Conference, Winter 2003, ed. A. Cashin and J. Jirsa, 
Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows‟ Conferences, Vol. 16. 
10 Gerhardt Stoltenberg, Wall Street Journal Europe, 2 October 1986, as cited in C. Randall Henning, Macroeconomic 
Diplomacy in the 1980s: Domestic Politics and International Conflict Among the United States, Japan, and Europe, 
Atlantic Paper No. 65 (New York: Croom Helm, for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1987), p. 1. 
11 Richard Eichenberg has held grants and fellowships from the Mellon Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Center for 
International Affairs at Harvard University, and the Social Science Research Council. Professor Eichenberg's research 
focuses on public opinion, foreign policy, European integration, and gender politics. 
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1997, 10). Whilst the elite decision already confirmed cooperation on a level I, Lantis states that because of 
interest, pressure and threats five domestic factors can constrain the eventual outcome. These are: major party 
unity, ruling coalition consensus, symmetry of effects, election results and public support (1997, 10-17). By 
breaking down the complex process of foreign policy decisions into phases, one can examine how domestic 
factors can ''unravel previously reached agreements'' in what Lantis refers to as the post commitment phase 
(Lantis 1997, 5). 
To address the problem of ''unraveled agreements'', Lantis proposes a post commitment politics framework based 
on three arguments: international cooperation is the product of a sequential process; five domestic political 
conditions can influence the durability of a leader‟s prior international agreement to cooperate and the proximity 
of these domestic political conditions to the ruling elite determines their relative impact (Lantis 1997, 6-7). 
Political proximity means that every domestic factor has a relative impact on the behavior to the center which is 
in this case, the behavior of the ruling elite to defect or cooperate. The role of political proximity will be 
discussed at the end of this chapter and will be clarified by means of a model. International cooperation is seen 
as a product of a least four sequential stages (1997, 7). The stages as Lantis identifies them are: The leader seeks 
international cooperation and calculates domestic support (T1); The leader makes an initial commitment to 
cooperate with other member states within the context of an international organization by setting the agenda 
(T2); There are subsequent elite efforts to ratify the commitment (T3); There is a final foreign policy decision to 
sustain or defect from the commitment (T4). Each of these stages are more or less influenced by domestic 
constraints. For this study, I will focus on the stages of T3 and T4.  
Hypotheses on domestic impact 
First, major party unity is important for implementing foreign policy decisions since factionalism within the 
party can undermine a predominant leader's position (Rousseau et al. 2012, 353). Factionalism is defined as 
formal or informal divisions among elites within a party organization based on different beliefs about the proper 
conduct of policy (Lantis 1997, 11). Scholars like Duverger, Rose and DeSwaan have argued that elites can have 
direct and personal impact on policy decisions (Lantis 2009, 387). Control of the policy process can therefore be 
seen as a function of elite political maneuvering (1997, 11). Lantis formulates the following assumption 
regarding major party unity: An initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of an 
international organization is less likely to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when the 
leaders of the major party in government are divided over the issue. 
Secondly, maintenance of coalition consensus and the party elites in coalition governments is of critical concern 
since the major party in government needs the other parties (junior parties) to assure a majority in control of 
parliament (1997, 12). In proportional systems, junior parties can gain influence over foreign policy decisions by 
using their leverage of continued participation in the coalition. In extreme cases coalitions can be 'hijacked' by 
these junior parties (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, 77).  As a result inter-party can affect the leader's earlier 
commitment to an international organization (Kaarbo and Kenealy 2014). Hence, the next assumption made is: 
An initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of an international organization is less likely 
to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when leaders of different parties in the coalition 
government are divided over the issue. 
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The third domestic factor Lantis exposed, draws away from political institutions. Decision makers, he argues, 
must also consider ''the satisfaction of domestic interest groups when approaching decision made over foreign 
policy'' (1997, 13). Therefore he integrates literature on corporatism with studies on foreign policy decision 
making. He bases his argument on Karns and Mingst (1995) by stating that ''the larger the number of competing 
groups the more likely it is that (…) the policy outcome will reflect the least common denominator among policy 
options favored by the different interest groups''. The least common denominator refers to defect on controversial 
decisions of international organizations (Kesign and Kaarbo 2010, 26). Mostly these controversial decisions 
concern economic/developmental issues as Lantis states that ''military/security issues have more of a 
symmetrical potential impact on the populace and will therefore have less of a tendency to attract a devise debate 
about policy resource distribution (1997, 14). As a result his hypothesis on the third factor is: An initial 
commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of an international organization is less likely to be 
sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when it involves economic/developmental issues rather 
than military/security issues. 
The last two factors Lantis accounts for in his conceptual framework are electoral performance and public 
support. These factors overlap in several ways. For example, Lantis builds his argument of the impact of 
electoral performance on earlier work of Kant and Bentham by arguing that democratic elections serve as the key 
mediating institution which link popular opinion to policy choice (1997, 15). Besides the outcome of electoral 
performance, Lantis emphasizes the importance of timing of elections. Results and timing affect the leader's 
ability to uphold on earlier commitments to international organizations (1997, 15). Therefore the fourth 
hypothesis under study is: An initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of an international 
organization is less likely to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when the major party 
loses support in national or regional elections. To conclude, the last domestic factor examined is public support. 
Lantis underscores the change in public opinion toward ruling parties in the period leading up to the 
implementation of the decision (1997, 16). This is an important intervening variable in parliamentary systems 
like Germany, because these states deal with rotational regional elections schedules. Therefore leaders are always 
concerned with their party electoral performance and public support for the next election. As a result, the last  
hypothesis under study is: An initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of an international 
organization is less likely to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when the major party 
loses support in public opinion polls. Lantis found that by combing the relative influence of these five factors, a 
conceptual framework of the impact on cooperation or defect behavior on an international commitment can be 
formed. This conceptual framework is called the role of political proximity and will be explained in the last 
section of this chapter. 
The role of political proximity 
To conclude the theoretical part of this thesis, Lantis assumes that the proximity of the domestic political 
conditions to the power center is important. This means that ruling coalition consensus has a much higher degree 
of impact than, for example, election performance. It can be interpreted as a framework composed of concentric 
circles (Lantis 1997, 18). This has been exposed in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The role of political proximity 
 
Source: Lantis, J. 1997. Domestic Constraints and the Breakdown of International Agreements. New York: 
Praeger, pp. 19 
 
The justification for this model is derived from two fields of proximity and its intensity, namely public policy 
and comparative foreign policy studies. Scholars on comparative foreign policy studies have stated that ''the 
more proximate the condition is to the center [the behavior of the ruling elite], the bigger its influence will be'' 
(Andriole et al. 1975, 175). Major party unity is considered to be the most important intervening condition for 
the cadre of party elite. There are two main reasons Lantis accounts for this. First, he states that major party unity 
represents a variable that is 'inside the system'. Since intraparty political maneuvering occurs daily within 
parliamentary democracies, he assumes that this ''represents a challenge to the power base of key actors''. 
Secondly, the same cause can also challenge the personal position of a key actor with respect to his authority 
(1997, 19). Next to intraparty politics, interparty politics ''is a concern that develops from inside the government 
and is a factor that has a direct impact on the decision-making structure and further process'' (1997, 19). 
Therefore it is considered as the second most important factor to influence the foreign policy decision to 
cooperate or defect.   
The three remaining factors represents variables „outside the system‟. Of these three factors, symmetry of effects 
accounts for the biggest influence. Symmetry of effects is interpreted as „more effective‟ than public support 
since domestic interest groups are ''well-organized, goal-driven and well-funded'' (1997, 20). The remaining 
variables, election results and public support, represent only an indirect impact on the behavior of political 
leaders. It is included in the model of domestic politics since ''there is evidence of a linkage between electoral 
cycles,  public attitudes and foreign policy decisions'' (1997, 20). On the other hand, these factors are 
„downgraded‟ by Lantis since he addresses their limitations. Election results are less significant [than major party 
unity and ruling coalition consensus, red.] because of their cyclical character. The impact of public support is 
assumed to be limited since public interests are ''diffuse, non-goal directed and are outside the political system'' 
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(1997, 20).  However, the argument of political proximity is presented as a foundation of Lantis‟ theory for a 
systematic review on how different conditions of domestic politics can affect foreign policy behavior.   
Methodology and operationalization of variables 
To address the role of political proximity within the theory of a two level game, this study examines all five 
hypotheses by Lantis for the case of German defection in taking part in NATO‟s no-fly zone mission to Libya. 
As a result, in the upcoming sections this study seeks an answer to the initial research question: ''Which domestic 
factors account for German defection on the ratification of NATO‟s strategic concept of 2010 regarding the 
mission to Libya?'' 
This study‟s dependent variable is German defection. I defined German defection as the formal voting procedure 
in which German domestic political institutions are required to not implement the strategic guidelines of NATO 
as set out in NATO‟s strategic concept of 2010: Active Engagement, Modern Defence by taking part in a no-fly 
zone to Libya. I have chosen to measure defection in this manner, as opposed to considering Germany‟s initial 
agreement to the strategic guideline, because a strategic guideline cannot be executed by Germany unless it is 
ratified by German domestic political institutions. In addition to the dependent variable I will examine the 
following five independent variables for my case: (1) major party unity, (2) ruling coalition consensus, (3) the 
symmetry of effects of foreign policy decisions, (4) election performance, (5) public support.  
Major party unity is measured by data from comparative political studies (amongst others Kaarbo; 2008, Lantis; 
1996, Rousseau; 2012 and Kesgin; 2010) as well as German press releases, speeches and interviews. 
Factionalism in the major party, regarding to policy making, is defined as formal or informal divisions among 
elites within a party organization based on different beliefs about the proper conduct of policy (Lantis 1997, 11). 
Ruling coalition consensus is measured by data from comparative political studies, as well as German press 
releases, speeches and interviews. Coalition consensus is defined as consensus among party elites in coalition 
governments (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008, 74). Symmetry of effects of foreign policy decisions is measured by 
secondary literature study on foreign policy analyses as well as comparative, historic German foreign policy 
studies (amongst others Lantis; Lantis and Kaarbo). Symmetry of effects is defined as a large number of 
competing groups whom reflect the least common denominator among the policy outcomes favored by these 
different groups (Martin 1992, 770). Election performance is measured by using statistics on German voting 
outcomes during the elections between 2009 and 2011. These includes regional elections (2011) as well as 
parliamentary elections (2009). The measurement will account for the coalition parties in the German parliament 
during the time period of 2010-2011. Election performance is then defined as „strong‟ and „weak‟ relative to 
previous elections, if applicable. Public support is measured by using public opinion polls of TNS EMNID as 
published by German newspapers, articles and official government releases during the year of the U.N. 
resolution on the NATO mission to Libya was conducted (2011). I categorized public opinion into two 
categories: „low‟ and „strong‟ support. Public support of 30 percent or less was categorized as „low‟ public 
support. Public support of 60 percent and more was categorized as „strong‟ support. 
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Examining the effect of domestic factors on German defection; testing the predictions 
To understand German decision making and the effect of domestic factors, it is important to know which 
political actors were involved during the time. In 2011, the Bundesregierung was a coalition of three parties: the 
CDU, CSU and FDP. Head of government was Angela Merkel, leader of the biggest party in Germany: the 
Christian Democrats (CDU). One of the coalition partners in Merkel-II was the conservative part of the CDU, 
the Christian Socialists (CSU). Together they form the so called Union. The CSU delivered the minister of 
defense, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. However, he was replaced by Thomas de Maizière (also a member of the 
CSU) at the beginning of March 2011 (because Zu Guttenberg was accused of plagiarism in his dissertation.) 
More important is the position of German foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, a crucial actor in this context. 
Westerwelle is part of the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP), the German liberal party. This junior party was 
relevant to the continuation of Merkel-II since it held crucial positions. Besides the position of foreign minister 
in das Kabinett, Westerwelle was also vice chancellor which meant he was Merkel‟s surrogate when she was 
absent. Moreover, Westerwelle was also leader of the FDP and his actions therefore turned out as crucial with 
regards to the impact of domestic factors.  
Public opinion 
First, this study tests the hypothesis that an initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of an 
international organization is less likely to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when the 
major party loses support in public opinion polls. As the German newspaper der Spiegel already predicted in 
2010, it looked like the CDU was losing support in public opinion polls. A series of seven state elections in 2011 
could turn into a nightmare for chancellor Angela Merkel, as opinion polls suggested the elections would reflect 
a dramatic slump in support for her coalition. The government would be ousted by a center-left alliance of Social 
Democrats and Greens, according to opinion polls which put support for Merkel‟s government at just 37 
percent.
12
 
Moreover, TNS EMNID conducted a „Umfrage‟ in which they asked the German people whether they would 
support intervention in Libya by international forces.
 13
62 Percent of the respondents said military action against 
Ghadaffi was a „justified and correct course of action‟, while just 30 percent of the respondents were against it. 
However, only 30 percent of the Germans was in favor of direct involvement of German forces in Libya whereas 
65 percent of them was against.
14
 This means that there was „strong‟ public support for international intervention 
but „low‟ public support for German intervention. This is shown in Table 1.  
 
 
                                                             
12 Der Spiegel. ''Letter from Berlin: Merkel Braces for Election Debacles in 2011. '' December 28, 2010. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/letter-from-berlin-merkel-braces-for-election-debacles-in-2011-a-
736816.html 
13 TNS EMNID is one of the biggest and most leading research agencies in Germany. With their expertise and their broad 
range of studies, they conduct polls on approximately every subject concerning German politics. 
14 Welt Online. ''62 Prozent der Deutschen für einen Militärschlag. '' March 20, 2011. 
http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article12893939/62-Prozent-der-Deutschen-fuer-Militaerschlag.html#disqus_ 
 
13 
 
Table 1. Public support for mission to Libya 
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Source: Based on an opinion poll by TNS EMNID. Accessed on July 21, 2011. As published by German 
newspaper „die Welt‟; http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article12893939/62-Prozent-der-Deutschen-fuer-
Militaerschlag.html#disqus_thread 
 
The survey of TNS EMNID indicates a rejection of Germany taking part in NATO action in Libya. Some 
scholars argue that the government‟s position reflected the public opinion but the German government already 
made clear in February that it did not believe in the effectiveness of any kind of military means and actions. It 
was in favor of enforcing the sanctions made in UN Resolution 1970. The government‟s position never 
conflicted with the public opinion on a German part in the mission to Libya since it was never even an advocate 
of intervention in the first place. Support (or a lack of) for Merkel and the CDU party can therefore not be seen 
as a derivative of its point of view on German intervention in Libya. If public support had had an (indirect) 
impact it can be marked as a reinforcement of Merkel‟s position and the position already held by the CDU and 
its coalition members on this matter. The results of the impact on public support confirm the hypothesis as set 
out by Lantis.  
Electoral performance 
The second hypothesis under study is that an initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of 
an international organization is less likely to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when 
the major party loses support in national or regional elections. On the 14
th
 of October 2009, the Federal 
Returning Officer announced the official result of the 17
th
 German Bundestag elections on 27 September 2009. 
With a voter turnout of 70.8 percent, the CDU remained the biggest party in the German Bundestag (27.3 percent 
against 27.8 percent in 2005, red.)
15 
Merkel choose to form a coalition with daughter party CSU (6.5 percent) 
and the FDP (14.6 percent). The electoral results for the FDP were remarkable. The FDP received almost 15 
percent against 9.8 percent in 2005. This is a growth of 67.12 percent. However, in the following regional 
elections of 2011 (seen as a bearing for the national government‟s popularity) the results tempered the success of 
Merkel-II. Seven of Germany's 16 states held elections in 2011. On February 20, the results from Hamburg 
showed that the CDU was swept from power in the federal state of Hamburg with their worst result since World 
                                                             
15 Official result for the 2009 Bundestag election; https://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/elections/results/.thread  
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War II, plunging 20.7 percentage points from the last election to 21.9 percent (Brockmeier 2013, 73). On March 
20, just seven days before Germany voted to abstain on Resolution 1973, the results coming from the federal 
state of Saxony-Anhalt were damaging the position of the CDU as well as the FDP. The CDU fell 3.7 points to 
32.5 percent in the poor eastern state of Saxony-Anhalt but held onto power in a grand coalition with the SPD, 
who won 21.5 percent. The FDP won only 3.8 percent of the vote and were ejected from the state assembly in 
Magdeburg, which party chief Westerwelle, called a "bitter defeat".
16
As mentioned above in this study, besides 
the major party foreign minister Westerwelle also had a great interest in a strong electoral result for his junior 
party since he held crucial positions in the government of Merkel-II. Moreover, it is unclear whether he would be 
able to hold on to his post as FDP leader if the party were to suffer another humiliation during the next round. 
Figure two shows an overview of the electoral performance of Merkel-II until the end of March. 
Figure 2. Electoral performance Merkel-II at the regional elections of 2011 (February-March) 
 CDU FDP 
Hamburg (February 20
th
)  21.9 percent (-20.7 percent) n.a. 
Saxony-Anhalt (March 20
th
) 32.5 percent (-3.7 percent) 3.8 percent (lost power to the SPD) 
Baden-Wuerttemberg (March 27
th
)  39.0 percent (lost power to centre 
left coalition of the SPD/Greens) 
5.3 percent (n.a.) 
 
The decision to cooperate on Resolution 1973 became indeed less likely since Merkel already experienced two 
regional losses for the CDU. However, the questions arises whether this can be blamed on the tensions in Libya 
or other issues which seemed to have mobilized the German public opinion more. For example, Merkel seemed 
to be punished by the German voter for her mishandling of nuclear issues during the elections in Baden-
Wuerttemberg on March 27
th
, where anti-nuclear sentiment was mobilized by events in Japan.
17
  
Symmetry of effects 
The third hypothesis under study, namely that an initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context 
of an international organization is less likely to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when 
it involves economic/developmental issues rather than military/security issues highlights the assumption about 
the traditional German reluctance against the use of any kind of force. Why did German military intervention in 
Libya not become a politicized subject in the public debate or in the upcoming elections, if the public opinion 
was indeed against such a military intervention? At the time of the intervention in Libya, German military forces 
were already involved in ten missions abroad (Brockmeier 2013, 74). But one crucial factor can be that the 
public support and the issue on military and security matters are influenced by a historical narrative. Since the 
end of World War II, the Germans have a traditional reluctance against the use of any kind of force (Noetzel and 
Schreer 2008, 217). Evidence show the sensitive of German military participation in the post-cold war era and 
                                                             
16 Press office Reuters. ''Factbox: German state elections in 2011'', Septemer 18th 2011. As seen on: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/18/us-germany-states-factbox-idUSTRE78H1S520110918 
17
 BBC. ''Germany: Angela Merkel loses key state elections'', March 27th  2011. As seen on: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12876083  
15 
 
cases like Yugoslavia when domestic interests groups had been protesting against the German government 
(Lantis 1996, 24). In 2011, the decision against military action in Libya may be reinforced by the dissatisfaction 
of the German military presence in Afghanistan. Not only the public, but also politicians (like foreign minister 
Westerwelle) were dissatisfied with military participation in Afghanistan. One of them noticed that ''the country 
has been dragged into an unpopular, prolonged war''
18
.  
The general German skepticism is not sufficient to explain German defection in participating in the Libya 
intervention, but it is crucial for analyzing the impact of domestic factors. The reluctance against military 
involvement did affect the public opinion, but moreover, this effect of symmetry is also important when looking 
to factors within the system. As the analysis turns to the factors within the system, this study shows that in 
released German press statements and other official documents, the role and anti-involvement rhetoric of Guido 
Westerwelle played an important role in the decision to defect on Resolution 1973. 
Ruling coalition consensus and major party unity 
As one of the factors „within the system‟, ruling coalition consensus is considered to be one of the biggest 
influence on the eventual decision to cooperate or defect on an initial agreement. Therefore, the fourth 
assumption under study is that an initial commitment to cooperate with other states in the context of an 
international organization is less likely to be sustained in the post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when 
leaders of different parties in the coalition government are divided over the issue. For this case, the leaders of the 
parties in the coalition government are the same actors who conducted (or co-conducted) the controversial 
decision on voting to abstain on Resolution 1973. The reluctance on military intervention gave the impression of 
an united feeling amongst all domestic actors involved to vote to abstain on the resolution. However, actors 
„within the system‟ had their doubts about this. For example, Peter Wittig the German senior diplomat at the 
United Nations who eventually raised his hand within the Security Council, was actually an advocate of a „yes‟ 
vote. As an expert on foreign policy, he feared the consequences of German isolation if the country voted 
together with the BRIC countries. It appeared that the same fears were also present within the coalition, causing 
serious dissension in the German parliament about whether to cooperate or defect on its duties within NATO.  
Foreign minister Guido Westerwelle was inexperienced (Brockmeier 2013, 82). Academics and experts argue 
that Westerwelle may not fully grasped the signal he disposed to the world by the abstention in the Security 
Council. His media performance and comments on the German position on Resolution 1973 (he frequently 
compared intervention in Libya to Afghanistan and Iraq) lead to conversations with opposition leaders in 
parliament. The decision to participate in the Iraq mission was highly unpopular (Lantis and Kaarbo 2003, 223). 
This made it a good case for Westerwelle to compare Iraq to a potential non-intervention in Libya. Officials at 
the Foreign Office asked why Westerwelle did not have the same conversations with the office, since the 
decision was also considered a NATO matter. But for Westerwelle all that mattered was the question whether the 
parliamentary party leaders agreed with him on the question of non-participation. If party leaders would agree 
with him on the non-participation and the traditional point of view on military reluctance, than they would also 
agree with voting to abstain he assumed. A few days after the decision, rumours appeared in the German media 
stating that Merkel had pressured the foreign minister to agree on abstention since his first intention was to vote 
                                                             
18
 Statement based on the article: “Wir gingen davon aus, in zwei Jahren wäre das erledigt.” Loyal-Magazin für 
Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 8, 2011: 28-29.  
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„no‟ on the resolution. Merkel and officials quickly responded to the rumour, saying it was ''completely made 
up''. But later that year, in October 2011, the story was repeated based on ''serious sources in well informed 
government circles'' (Brockmeier 2013, 77). To conclude, this study tests the hypothesis of an initial commitment 
to cooperate with other states in the context of an international organization is less likely to be sustained in the 
post commitment phase, ceteris paribus, when the leaders of the major party in government are divided over the 
issue. Elites within the CDU were concerned with involvement in the NATO mission. They formed the 
conviction that France (initiator of Resolution 1973) was seeking NATO structures in order to achieve its own 
national goals. Moreover, they believed that activity within crisis management benefited France as a 
counterweight to its diminishing political and economic influence in the EU.
19
 As a result, the chancellor and her 
minister of defense were unanimous in their decision to contribute to involvement in Libya. Merkel and other 
elites within the CDU wanted to achieve this with a bigger shared contribution to the CSDP [the Common 
Security and Defense Policy of the EU, red.].
20
 Yet because the German government has to operate within a 
coalition government, the implications of these changes had not been adequately recognized during the time of 
the voting on Resolution 1973. The CDU-CSU-FDP coalition was contaminated with the prevailing view of 
military reluctance, as mentioned in the analysis of the symmetry of effects, and as a result defense spending 
overall was poor.
21
  
Exposing mechanisms 
When examining domestic factors like public opinion and electoral results the position of Merkel‟s right-hand 
and foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, seems to account for an important part in the decision to defect. This 
becomes even more clear when examining the factors within the system. At this point, one can argue the 
applicability of the role of political proximity on coalition governments. It appeared that the junior party, and 
especially the leader of the junior party played a crucial role in this case. Westerwelle covered three important 
positions in Merkel-II: he was the leader of the FDP, he was foreign minister and moreover he was vice 
chancellor. As a result, Westerwelle had to deal with several actors within the system. One of the main critics on 
his policy was that he was inexperienced. As a result, his points of view divided the coalition. Senior diplomats 
like Wittig were advocates of a 'yes' vote on Resolution 1973. Instead of talking to the Foreign Office, 
Westerwelle tried to convince the parliament of his ideas on how to deal with voting on Resolution 1973 (at the 
time  he wanted a 'no' vote).  This caused tension within the system and according to the rumors in the German 
media, Merkel had to pressure the foreign minister to -at least- vote to abstain. Within Merkel's party, the CDU, 
there were never such tensions and therefore it seems that the junior party had a greater influence on the decision 
to defect then the model on the role of political proximity suggests. 
 
 
                                                             
19 Gotkowska, Justyna. ''More engagement? German security policy of the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition. May 2th, 2014. As seen 
on: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-02-05/more-engagement-german-security-policy-cdu/csu-spd-
coalition  
20 See for example the electoral programm of the CDU at http://www.cdu.de/   
21 Dyson, Tom. ''The reluctance of German politicians to take a strong line on defence policy poses a security risk for 
Europe''. September 5th, 2013. As seen on: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/09/05/the-reluctance-of-german-
politicians-to-take-a-strong-line-on-defence-policy-poses-a-security-risk-for-europe/  
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Conclusion and discussion 
The results of this study point to the fact that the relative influence of domestic factors indeed effect the eventual 
decision to defect or cooperate. The factors analyzed here show however that domestic politics are also 
influenced themselves and social constructed by historic narratives and prominent individuals within a junior 
party.  
First, there was never a lack of public support in Germany to defect on Resolution 1973. The public supported 
international intervention but agreed with the government‟s position to not involve in military action itself. 
Moreover, German elites never really tried to convince the public of the „good‟ of a military intervention since 
they believed themselves that sanctions were 'more effective'. If public support had had an indirect impact, it can 
be seen as a reinforcement of the position already held by the government. However, the public opinion had an 
influence on the regional elections at the time. The coalition partners both experienced losses in respectively the 
state of Hamburg on February 20
th
 (reported as the worst result in this state for the CDU since World War Two) 
and the state of Saxony-Anhalt on March 20
th
 (which was a „bitter defeat‟ for the FDP according to Westerwelle 
himself) just weeks before the eventual decision to vote to abstain. With the next election due just ten days after 
the decision, it seems plausible that Merkel did not want to upset her voters by taking unpopular decisions even 
though such decisions would perhaps be in the state‟s interest. A side note on this argument for the case of 
German defection in the NATO mission to Libya, is that it appears that other issues had a bigger impact on 
Merkel‟s unpopularity at that time. For example, the Greens won the elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg at the 
expense of the CDU since Merkel became unpopular because of her statements on nuclear issues. The nuclear 
issue was more politicized at the time because of the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima. To conclude, the factors 
of public support and electoral performance are influenced by a historical narrative. With a tradition of military 
reluctance since the end of World War II, it is not surprising that the German citizen nor the German government 
was against German military intervention in the Libya conflict. 
Other studies (like Kaarbo and Beasley; 2008) already underscored the scenario of a 'hijacked' coalition at the 
hands of a junior party. Moreover, it appears that if prominent elites within such a junior party also occupy 
crucial positions in a coalition, this undermines the biggest impact of a major party unity. For specific cases, 
historical narratives and views, also influence a standardized set of factors. On the other side, this study was a 
one-case study in which the role of political proximity within the theory of a two-level game was examined. 
When analyzing the case under study, it appeared however that the process of ratification was also influenced by 
international factors. For example, the skeptical position of the United States is assumed to have reinforce the 
position of German policy makers on military reticence. But since evidence indeed prove the impact of several 
domestic factors, additional research on the impact of international factors [in relationship to the role of political 
proximity, red.] may therefore support the hypotheses on the impact of these domestic factors. These findings 
have continuing relevance for understanding the interaction between international and domestic politics. 
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